In this paper we show that the hidden subgroup problem in nil-2 groups, that is in groups of nilpotency class at most 2, can be solved efficiently by a quantum procedure. The algorithm is an extension of our earlier method for extraspecial groups in Ivanyos et al. (Proceedings of the 24th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects  of Computer Science (STACS), vol. 4393, pp. 586-597, 2007), but it has several additional features. It contains a powerful classical reduction for the hidden subgroup problem in nilpotent groups of constant nilpotency class to the specific case where the group is a p-group of exponent p and the subgroup is either trivial or cyclic. This reduction might also be useful for dealing with groups of higher nilpotency class. The quantum part of the algorithm uses well chosen group actions based on some automorphisms of nil-2 groups. The right choice of the actions requires the solution of a system of quadratic and linear equations. The existence of a solution is guaranteed by the Chevalley-Warning theorem, and we prove that it can also be found efficiently.
Introduction
Efficient solutions to some cases of the hidden subgroup problem (HSP), a paradigmatic group theoretical problem, constitute probably the most notable successes of quantum computing. The problem consists in finding a subgroup H in a finite group G hidden by some function which is constant on each coset of H and is distinct on different cosets. The hiding function can be accessed by an oracle, and in the overall complexity of an algorithm, a query counts as a single computational step. To be efficient, an algorithm has to be polylogarithmic in the order of G. While classically no algorithms of polynomial query complexity are possible for the HSP, it can be solved efficiently in abelian groups by a quantum algorithm. A detailed description of the so called standard algorithm can be found for example in [19] . The main quantum tool of this algorithm is Fourier sampling, based on the efficiently implementable Fourier transform in abelian groups. Factorization and discrete logarithm [14, 28] are special cases of this solution.
After the settling of the abelian case, substantial research was devoted to the HSP in some finite non-abelian groups. Beside being the natural generalization of the abelian case, the interest of this problem is enhanced by the fact that important algorithmic problems, such as graph isomorphism, can be cast in this framework. The standard algorithm has been extended to some non-abelian groups by Rötteler and Beth [25] , Hallgren et al. [9] , Grigni et al. [7] and Moore et al. [21] . For the Heisenberg group, Bacon, Childs and van Dam [1] used the pretty good measurement to reduce the HSP to some matrix sum problem that they could solve classically. Ivanyos et al. [12] and Friedl et al. [5] have efficiently reduced the HSP in some non-abelian groups to HSP instances in abelian groups using classical and quantum group theoretical tools, but not the non-abelian Fourier transform. This latter approach was used recently by Ivanyos et al. [13] for extraspecial groups.
The so far unknown complexity of two special cases of the HSP would be of particular interest. The first one is the hidden subgroup problem in the symmetric group because it contains as special instance the graph isomorphism problem. Recently, Moore, Russell and Sniady [22] have shown that no algorithm based one a particular approach can solve the graph isomorphism problem efficiently. The other one is the hidden subgroup problem in the dihedral group because of its relation to certain lattice problems investigated by Regev [26] .
In this work we extend the family of groups where the HSP is efficiently solvable by a quantum algorithm to nilpotent groups of nilpotency class at most 2 (nil-2 groups, in short). These are groups whose lower (and upper) central series are of length at most 2. Equivalently, a group is nil-2 group if the derived subgroup is contained in the center. Nilpotent groups form a rich subclass of solvable groups, they contain for example all (finite) p-groups. Extraspecial groups are, in particular, nil-2 groups. Our main result is: Theorem 1 Let G be a nil-2 group, and let f be an oracle that hides the subgroup H of G. Then there is an efficient quantum procedure which finds H .
The overall structure of the algorithm presented here is closely related to the algorithm in [13] for extraspecial groups, but has also several additional features. The quantum part of the algorithm is restricted to specific nil-2 groups, which are also p-groups and are of exponent p (that is, in which every element has order 1 or p). It consists essentially in the creation of a quantum hiding procedure (a natural quantum generalization of a hiding function) for the subgroup H G of G, where G stands for the derived (a.k.a. commutator) subgroup of G. The procedure uses certain automorphisms of the groups to define some appropriate group actions, and is analogous to what has been done in [13] for extraspecial p-groups of exponent p.
While dealing with extraspecial p-groups of exponent p basically solves the HSP for all extraspecial groups (the case of remaining groups, of exponent p 2 , easily reduces to groups of exponent p), this is far from being true for nil-2 groups. Indeed, one of the main new features of the current algorithm is a classical reduction of the HSP in nil-2 groups to the HSP in p-groups of exponent p and nilpotency class at most 2, where moreover the hidden subgroup is either trivial or of cardinality p. In fact, our result is much more general: we prove an analogous reduction in nil-k groups for any constant k. We believe that this general reduction might be useful for designing efficient quantum algorithms for the HSP in groups of higher nilpotency class.
Our second main novel feature concerns the quantum hiding procedure for H G . While in extraspecial groups it was reduced to the efficient solvability of a single quadratic and a single linear equation modulo p, here we look for a nontrivial solution of a homogeneous system of d quadratic and d linear equations, where d can be any integer. The reason for this is that while in extraspecial groups the derived subgroup is one dimensional, in nil-2 groups we have no a priori bound on its dimension. If the number of variables exceeds the global degree of the system then the solvability itself is an immediate consequence of the Chevalley-Warning theorem [3, 30] : the number of solutions is divisible by p and therefore there is always a nontrivial one. (See [20] for the complexity theory aspects of search problems where existence of a solution is guaranteed by mathematical theorems.) Our result is that if the number of variables is sufficiently large, more precisely is of (d 3 ), then we can also find a nontrivial solution in polynomial time.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Sect. 2 we briefly describe the extension of the standard algorithm for quantum hiding procedures, and then we discuss some basic properties of nilpotent groups, in particular p-groups of exponent p and of nilpotency class at most 2. Section 3 contains the description of the classical reduction of the HSP in groups of constant nilpotency class to instances where the group is also of exponent p, and the subgroup is either trivial or cyclic of order p. Section 4 gives the description of the quantum algorithm for the special instances: we reduce finding H to the design of an efficient hiding procedure for H G , and prove the existence of such a procedure. Finally Sect. 5 shows how to solve the system of quadratic and linear equations occurring in the design of the hiding procedure.
Even if the hidden subgroup problem is hard for the symmetric group and also for general solvable groups, it may happen that there is an efficient solution in nilpotent groups. The works [1, 13] and this paper can be considered as the first steps in investigating the complexity of the HSP for this family of groups.
Preliminaries

Extension of the Standard Algorithm for the Abelian HSP
We will use standard notions of quantum computing for which one can consult for example [23] . For a finite set X, we denote by |X the uniform superposition 1 √ |X| x∈X |x over X. For a superposition | , we denote by supp(| ) the support of | , that is the set of basis elements that occur in | with non-zero amplitude.
The standard algorithm for the abelian HSP repeats polynomially many times Fourier sampling involving the same hiding function, to obtain in each iteration a random element from the subgroup orthogonal to the hidden subgroup. In fact, for repeated Fourier samplings, the existence of a common hiding function can be relaxed in several ways. Firstly, in different iterations different hiding functions can be used, and secondly, classical hiding functions can be replaced by quantum hiding functions. This was formalized in [13] , and we recall here the precise definition.
A set of vectors {| g : g ∈ G} from some Hilbert space H is a hiding set for the subgroup H of G if -| g is a unit vector for every g ∈ G, -if g and g are in the same left coset of H then | g = | g , -if g and g are in different left cosets of H then | g and | g are orthogonal.
A quantum procedure is hiding the subgroup H of G if for every
The following fact whose proof is immediate from Lemma 1 in [12] recasts the existence of the standard algorithm for the abelian HSP in the context of hiding sets. 
Fact 1 Let
Nilpotent Groups
Let G be a finite group. For two elements g 1 and g 2 of G, we usually denote their product by g 1 g 2 . If we conceive group multiplication from the right as a group action of G on itself, we will use the notation g 1 · g 2 for g 1 g 2 . We write H ≤ G if H is a subgroup of G, and H < G if it is a proper subgroup. Normal subgroups and proper normal subgroups will be denoted respectively by H G and H G. For a subset X of G, let X be the subgroup generated by X. The normalizer of X in G is N G (X) = {g ∈ G : gX = Xg}. For an integer n, we denote by Z n the group of integers modulo n, and for a prime number p, we denote by Z * p the multiplicative group of integers relatively prime with p.
The 
The group G is nilpotent if there is a natural number n such that A n+1 = {1}. If n is the smallest integer such that A n+1 = {1} then G is nilpotent of nilpotency class n. It is a well known fact that G is nilpotent of nilpotency class n if and only if Z n = G in the upper central series. Nilpotent groups of nilpotency class 1 are simply the nontrivial abelian groups. A nilpotent group of nilpotency class at most n is called a nil-n group.
A detailed treatment of nilpotent groups can be found for example in Hall [8] . Let us just recall here that nilpotent groups are solvable, and that every p-group is nilpotent, where a p-group is a finite group whose order is a power of some prime number p.
Nil-2 p-groups of Exponent p
It is clear from the definition of nilpotent groups that G is a nil-2 group if G ≤ Z(G). It is easy to see that this property implies that the commutator is a bilinear function in the following sense.
Fact 2 Let G be a nil-2 group. Then for every g
The quantum part of our algorithm will deal only with special nilpotent groups of nilpotency class 2, which are also p-groups and are of exponent p. Recall that the exponent of a finite group G is the smallest integer e such that g e = 1 for every g ∈ G.
The exponent equals the least common multiple of the orders of the group elements. The structure of groups of exponent p and of nilpotency class 2 is well known, and is expressed in the following simple fact.
Fact 3 Let G be a p-group of exponent p and of nilpotency class at most 2. Then there exist integers m > 0 and d
We will say that a p-group G of exponent p and of nilpotency class at most 2 has
In those groups we will identify G and Z d p . Thus, for two elements z and z of G , the product zz is just z ⊕ z where ⊕ denotes the coordinate-wise addition modulo p. If G is a such a group then |G| = p m+d . The elements of G can be encoded by binary strings of length O((m + d) log p), and therefore, an algorithm on input G is considered efficient if it is of time polynomial in m, d and log p.
For j = 0, 1, . . . , p − 1, we consider maps
(1)
Proposition 1 Let G be a p group of nilpotency class and most 2 and of exponent p.
Then the maps φ j defined in
. . , m} and ∈ {1, . . . , d} define elements γ ik such that
(We use the notation for products in the commutative group G .) Fact 2 implies that We will exploit the following properties of the endomorphisms φ j .
Proposition 2 Let G be a p-group of exponent p and of nilpotency class at most 2.
Then the mappings φ j have the following properties:
Proof The first statement is obvious from the definition of φ j . The second statement is obvious for j = 0. To prove it for j ∈ Z * p , observe that φ j = (φ j ) := φ j • · · · • φ j (the composition of copies of φ j ) for every j ∈ Z p and for every integer 0 ≤ ≤ p −1. Let g be an element of G and let j 0 be a fixed primitive element of Z * p . From the definition of φ j one can see that
Clearly, for every g ∈ G, the element z g whose existence is stated in the second part of Proposition 2, is unique. From now on, let z g denote this unique element.
The choice of the automorphisms φ j is motivated by the remarkable property that they preserve subgroups modulo the derived subgroup G : Let H be a subgroup of G. Then φ j (H G ) = H G for every j = 1, . . . , p − 1. To see this, notice that, by the first statement of Proposition 2, φ j (G ) = G , and the second statement implies that φ j preserves cyclic, and therefore all, subgroups modulo G .
Classical Reductions in Groups of Constant Nilpotency Class
In order to present the reduction methods in a sufficiently general way, in this section we assume that our groups are presented in terms of so-called refined polycyclic presentations [10] . Such a presentation of a finite solvable group G is based on a sequence
is a normal subgroup of G i and the factor group G i /G i+1 is cyclic of prime order r i .
. Every element g of G can be uniquely represented as a product of the form g In the abstract presentation the generators are g 1 , . . . , g s , and for each index 1 ≤ i ≤ s, the following relations are included:
is the normal word for g
We assume that elements of G are encoded by normal words and there is a polynomial time algorithm in log |G|, the so called collection procedure, which computes normal words representing products.
Efficiency of most algorithms for computing with polycyclic presentations depends on existence of an efficient collection procedure. Although there are several methods which work well in practice and even there are some methods whose complexity is polynomial (in log |G|, that is in s i=1 log r i ) in special cases (see [6, 16, 17] ), it is an open question whether there exists a polynomial time collection procedure in general finite polycyclic groups. In nilpotent groups of constant nilpotency class, the complexity of the collection method proposed by Leedham-Green and Soicher [17] is polynomial for polycyclic presentations of restricted form: where the series G = G 1 · · · G s+1 = {1} is a refinement of the lower central series of G. For the description and a careful complexity analysis of a more general method which runs in polynomial time using arbitrary polycyclic presentations of groups of constant nilpotency class we refer the reader to Höfling's work [11] . (Actually, in a general finite solvable group the complexity of Höfling's method is (log |G|) O(t) , where t is the so called derived length of G, which, for a nilpotent group, is logarithmic in the nilpotency class.)
Having a polynomial time collection procedure for a family of nilpotent groups at hand, refined polycyclic presentations for subgroups and factor groups can be obtained in polynomial time [10] . There are also polynomial time methods for computing the Sylow subgroups, as well as the center and the commutator. Furthermore, in p-groups with refined polycyclic presentation, normalizers of subgroups can be computed in polynomial time using the technique of [4] , combined with the subspace stabilizer algorithm of [18] .
Finally we remark that, using a quantum implementation [12] of an algorithm of Beals and Babai [2] , a refined polycyclic presentation for a solvable black box group can be computed in polynomial time. Therefore our choice of the model for computing with nilpotent groups is not really restrictive.
Our first theorem is a classical reduction for the HSP in groups of constant nilpotency class. The proof is given by the subsequent three lemmas. Proof Assume that we have a procedure P which finds hidden subgroups in C under the promise that the hidden subgroup is trivial or is of order p. Let G be a group in C and let f be a function on G hiding the subgroup H of G. In Algorithm 1 we describe an iterative procedure which uses P as a subroutine and finds H in G.
Theorem 2 Let
Algorithm 1 (Reduction to the case where the hidden subgroup is small) success := TRUE,H = {1}. The basic idea is to compute a refined polycyclic sequence G = G 1 · · · G s 1 for G and to proceed calling P on the subgroups in the sequence starting with G s . When P finds for the first time a nontrivial subgroup generated by h, then we would like to restart the process in G/ h , and at the end, collect all the generators. Since h is not necessarily a normal subgroup of G we will actually restart the process instead in N G ( h ).
More formally, let us suppose that f hides H in G, and letH be some subgroup of Proof The basic idea of the reduction is computing a subgroup which contains all subgroups of order p of G and then restricting the problem to this group. If G/G has exponent larger than p then the hidden subgroup H , as all its elements are of order 1 or p, is contained in the proper subgroup G 0 = {x ∈ G|x p ∈ G } and the restriction of the function hiding H in G hides H in G 0 . The subgroup G 0 can be efficiently computed by observing that if g 1 , . . . , g t is an irredundant system of generators for G then G 0 is generated by G and g (The notation ⊗ is used for the tensor product of Z-modules, i.e., Abelian groups.) Induction based on this theorem proves that if the factor group G/G is of exponent p then so are all the factors A i /A i+1 . Then, we can see again by induction on i that for every g ∈ G we have g p i ∈ A i+1 , whence finally g p c = 1 and therefore the exponent of G is at most p c . 1 Now if p is not larger than the nilpotency class c of G then G has exponent bounded by the constant c c , and, as its derived length is at most c (actually, logarithmic in c), the quantum algorithm of [5] finds hidden subgroups of G in polynomial time. Otherwise the elements of order p or 1 form a subgroup G * , see Chap. 12 of [8] . Again, the hidden subgroup H is also a subgroup of G * and restriction of the function hiding H in G hides it in G * , therefore the reduction will consist in determining G * .
We design an algorithm that finds G * by induction on the length of refined polycyclic presentations. If |G| = p then G * = G. Otherwise, let G = G 1 G 2 · · · G s {1} be a refined polycyclic presentation with s ≥ 2. It is easy to construct a presentation where G s is a subgroup of the center of G, which we suppose from now on. For the ease of notation we set M = G 2 and N = G s .
We first describe the inductive step in a simplified case, with the additional hypothesis (G/N ) * = G/N . Observe that the hypothesis is equivalent to saying that the map φ : x → x p sends every element of G into N . From this it is also clear that the hypothesis carries over to M, that is (M/N ) * = M/N . We further claim that either G * = G or G * is a subgroup of G of index p. In fact this follows from Theorem 12.4.4 of [8] which states that the map φ is constant on cosets of G * and distinct on different cosets. From a polycyclic presentation of G it can be read off whether or not 
The Quantum Algorithm
The quantum part of our algorithm, up to technicalities, follows the same lines as the algorithm given in [13] for extraspecial groups.
Theorem 3
Let G be a p-group of exponent p and of nilpotency class 2, and let f be an oracle f which hides a subgroup H of G whose cardinality is either 1 or p. If we have an efficient quantum procedure (using f ) which hides H G in G then H can be found efficiently. Proof First observe that finding H is efficiently reducible to finding H G . Indeed, H G is an abelian subgroup of G since H is abelian. The restriction of the hiding function f to H G of G hides H . Therefore the standard algorithm for solving the HSP in abelian groups applied to H G with oracle f yields H .
Let us now suppose that G has parameters (m, d). We will show that finding H G can be efficiently reduced to the hidden subgroup problem in an abelian group. Let us denote for every element g = x We define the group G whose base set is {g : g ∈ G}. Observe that this set of elements does not form a subgroup in G. To make G a group, its law is defined by g 1 * g 2 = g 1 g 2 for all g 1 and g 2 in G. It is easy to check that * is well defined, and is indeed a group multiplication. In fact, the group G is isomorphic to G/G and therefore is isomorphic to Z m p . For our purposes a nice way to think about G as a representation of G/G with unique encoding. Observe also that H G ∩ G is a subgroup of (G, * )
To finish the proof, let us remark that the procedure which hides H G in G hides also H G ∩ G in G. Since G is abelian, Fact 1 implies that we can find efficiently H G ∩ G.
Now we turn to the construction of the hiding procedure for H G . The basic idea is the following. Suppose that we could create, for some a ∈ G, the coset state |aH G . Then the group action g → |aH G · g is a hiding procedure for the subgroup H G . (In general, for a ∈ G and K ≤ G the map g → |aKg is a hiding procedure for right cosets of K. In our case the subgroup H G is normal therefore the left and right cosets are the same.) Unfortunately, we are able to create states of the form |aH G efficiently when p and d are constant. In general, we can create efficiently |aH G u for random a ∈ G and an independent random u ∈ G , where by definition
Then |aH G u · h = |aH G u for every h ∈ H , and |G u · z = ω u,z |G u . To cancel the disturbing phase ω u,z we will use a more sophisticated group action via the group automorphisms φ j on several copies of the states |aH G u . We remark that, over extraspecial groups, this idea has an interpretation in terms of Fourier sampling in noncommutative groups and Clebsch-Gordan transforms (decomposition of tensor products of irreducible representations), see [15] . We formulate our result as follows.
Theorem 4 Let G be a p-group of exponent p and of nilpotency class 2, and let f be an oracle f which hides a subgroup H of G. Then there is an efficient quantum procedure which hides H G in G.
Proof The proof is segmented into several statements. The first lemma states that we can indeed create the states |aH G u efficiently, where G u is defined as in (2).
Lemma 4
There is an efficient quantum procedure which creates a state of the form
Proof We start with |0 |0 |0 . Since we have access to the hiding function f , we can create the superposition 1 √ |G| g∈G |0 |g |f (g) . Observing and discharging the third register we get |0 |aH for a random element a. Applying the Fourier transform over Z d p to the first register gives |Z p |aH . Multiplying the second register by the opposite of the first one results in
in the first register creates the required superposition.
Our next lemma which is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2 claims that the states |aH G u are eigenvectors of the group action of multiplication from the right by φ j (g), whenever g is from H G . Moreover, the corresponding eigenvalues are some powers of the root of the unity, the exponent does not depend on a, and the dependence on u and j is relatively simple.
Lemma 5
We have
The principal idea now is to take several copies of the states |a i H G u i and choose the j i so that the product of the corresponding eigenvalues becomes the unity. Therefore the combined actions φ j i (g), when g is from H G , will not modify the combined state. It turns out that we can achieve this with a sufficiently large number of copies. Let n = n(d) some function of d to be determined later.
For
Our purpose is to find an efficient procedure to generate triples (a, u, j) such that
We call such triples appropriate. The reason to look for appropriate triples is that they lead to hiding sets for H G in G as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 6 If (a, u, j) is an appropriate triple then {|
Proof To see this, first observe that H G is a normal subgroup of G. If g 1 and g 2 are in different cosets of H G in G then let 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that j i = 0. The elements φ j i (g 1 ) and φ j i (g 2 ) are in different cosets of H G in G since φ j i is an automorphism of G. Also, we have supp(|aH G u ) = supp(|aH G ), and therefore supp(|aH G u · φ j i (g 1 ) ) and supp(|aH G u ·φ j i (g 2 ) ) are included in different cosets and are disjoint. 
Let us now address the question of existence of appropriate triples and efficient ways to generate them. Let (a, u, j) be an arbitrary element of G n × (Z d p ) n × (Z p ) n \ {0 n }, and let g be an element of H G . Then g = hz for some h ∈ H and z ∈ Z d p , and
For a given u, we consider the following system of quadratic equations, written in vectorial form:
It should be clear that when this system has a nontrivial solution j (that is j = 0 d ) then (a, u, j) is an appropriate triple, for every a. In fact, the Chevalley-Warning theorem [3, 30] implies that the following equivalent system of vectorial equations has a nontrivial solution for every u, whenever n > 3d.
Moreover, if we take a substantially larger number of variables, we can find a solution classically in polynomial time. The proof of Theorem 5, as it consists in a classical algorithm, will be given in the next section. To finish the proof of Theorem 4 we describe the efficient hiding procedure. On input |g , it computes, for some a ∈ G n , the superposition
which by Lemma 4 can be done efficiently, and then it measures the registers for the u i . Then, by Theorem 5 it finds efficiently a nontrivial solution j for system (3).
Such a triple (a, u, j) is appropriate, and therefore by Lemma 6 {| a, u, j g : g ∈ G} is hiding for H G in G. Using the additional input |g , the procedure finally computes | a,u,j g .
Solving the System of Equations
This section is fully dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5. If p = 2 then the d quadratic and the d linear equations coincide, and the (linear) system can easily be solved in polynomial time. Therefore, from now on, we suppose that p > 2. Let us examine in detail the system (3), where we set u i = (u 1,i , u 2,i , . . . , u d,i ) . We have the following system of d homogeneous quadratic and d homogeneous linear one equations with n variables:
We start by considering only the quadratic part of (4), that is
for some integer n .
Claim 1 If
Proof For the ease of notation we are going to represent this system by the d × n matrix
We will present a recursive algorithm whose complexity will be polynomial in d and in log p. When d = 1, the unique quadratic equation is of the form u 1,1 j 2 1 + u 1,2 j 2 2 + u 1,3 j 2 3 = 0. According to a special case of the main result in the thesis of van de Woestijne (Theorem A3 of [29] ), a nontrivial solution for this can be found in polynomial time in log p.
Let us suppose now that we have d equations in n = (d + 1)(d + 2)/2 variables. We can make elementary operations on M (adding two rows and multiplying a row with a nonzero constant) without changing the solutions of the system. Our purpose is to reduce it with such operations to d − 1 equations in at least d(d + 1)/2 variables. If the system is of rank less than d, then we can erase an equation and get an equivalent system with only d − 1 equations in the same number of variables. Otherwise, we perform Gaussian elimination resulting in the matrix
. . . u
Since checking quadratic residuosity is simple, and for odd p, half of the elements of Z * p are squares, we can easily compute a quadratic non-residue λ in probabilistic polynomial time. Then every quadratic non-residue is the product of a square and λ. We will look at column d + 1 of M 1 . If the column is everywhere 0 then j d+1 = 1 and j i = 0 for i = d + 1 is a nontrivial solution of the whole system. Otherwise, without loss of generality, we can suppose that for some (k 1 , k 2 ) = (0, 0) the first k 1 elements of column d + 1 are squares, the following k 2 elements are the product of λ and a square, and the last d − k 1 − k 2 elements are zero. Thus there exist v 1 , . . . , v k 1 +k 2 different from 0, such that u (1) 
Once we have a quadratic non-residue, the square roots v 1 , . . . , v k 1 +k 2 can be found in deterministic polynomial time in log p by the Shanks-Tonelli algorithm [27] . We set the variables j k 1 +k 2 +1 , . . . , j d to 0, and eliminate columns
. . . u (2) 
In M 2 we subtract the first row from rows 2, . . . , k 1 and row k 1 + 1 from rows k 1 + 2, . . . , k 1 + k 2 . Then we set the variables j 2 , . . . , j k 1 to j 1 , and variables j k 1 +2 , . . . , j k 1 +k 2 to j k 1 +1 . The corresponding changes in the matrix are eliminating columns 2, . . . , k 1 and k 1 + 2, . . . , k 1 + k 2 and putting in columns 1 and k 1 + 1 everywhere 0 but respectively in row 1 and row k 1 + 1. Finally, by exchanging row 2 and row k 1 + 1, we get the matrix To finish the reduction, we will distinguish two cases, depending on the congruency class of p modulo 4. When p ≡ 1, the element −1 is a square, and in polynomial time in log p we can find s such that s 2 = −1. We set j 1 = sj d+1 , eliminate column 1 from matrix M 3 , put 0 in row 1 column d + 1, and exchange row 1 and row 2. When p ≡ 3 modulo 4, the element −1 is not a square, and therefore we can choose λ = −1. We set j k 1 +1 = j d+1 , eliminate column 2 from matrix M 3 , and put 0 in row 2 column d + 1.
In both cases we end up with a matrix of the form is a (nontrivial) solution of the linear part of (4), and therefore of the whole system. This finishes the proof of Theorem 5.
Observe that the only probabilistic part of the algorithm is the generation of a quadratic non-residue modulo p.
